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Showing posts with label Paul Krugman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Paul Krugman. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 16, 2025

Protected Sectors Of The US Economy

 

Several sectors of the U.S. economy currently benefit from significant government protection—through subsidies, tariffs, quotas, or regulatory barriers—and would struggle or potentially collapse in a truly free trade global architecture where markets are fully open, and there is no preferential treatment or government support. These sectors often survive not due to comparative advantage, but due to political lobbying, national security considerations, or strategic economic interests. Here’s a breakdown of the most protected and vulnerable sectors:


๐Ÿ”น 1. Agriculture

Why it’s protected:

  • Massive subsidies via the Farm Bill (e.g., crop insurance, direct payments, price supports).

  • Tariffs and import quotas on sugar, dairy, and other key commodities.

  • Political lobbying by powerful agricultural lobbies (e.g., American Farm Bureau, dairy and corn industries).

Why it wouldn’t survive freely:

  • Countries like Brazil, India, or Australia can produce many agricultural goods more cheaply due to climate, labor costs, and scale.

  • U.S. sugar and dairy prices are significantly higher than global averages due to protection.


๐Ÿ”น 2. Textiles and Apparel

Why it’s protected:

  • Tariffs and quotas to protect domestic manufacturers from cheap imports, especially from Asia.

  • Trade adjustment assistance programs.

Why it wouldn’t survive freely:

  • Labor costs in the U.S. are much higher than in Bangladesh, Vietnam, or India.

  • Most textile jobs have already offshored; remaining ones exist largely due to policy shielding.


๐Ÿ”น 3. Steel and Aluminum

Why it’s protected:

  • Section 232 tariffs on imported steel and aluminum, justified under national security grounds.

  • Anti-dumping duties against several countries (e.g., China, Turkey, Russia).

Why it wouldn’t survive freely:

  • Foreign producers, especially in China and India, have lower production costs and government subsidies.

  • U.S. producers would face severe price competition in an unprotected market.


๐Ÿ”น 4. Shipbuilding and Maritime Transport (Jones Act)

Why it’s protected:

  • The Jones Act mandates that ships transporting goods between U.S. ports must be built in the U.S., owned by Americans, and crewed by Americans.

Why it wouldn’t survive freely:

  • U.S.-built ships cost 4–5 times more than ships built in Korea or China.

  • The domestic shipping industry would collapse under global competition.


๐Ÿ”น 5. Sugar and Dairy Industries

Why it’s protected:

  • Import quotas and high tariffs.

  • Government-set minimum prices and supply management systems.

Why it wouldn’t survive freely:

  • Producers in places like Brazil (sugar) and New Zealand (dairy) are far more cost-efficient.

  • U.S. consumer prices for sugar are often double world prices because of protectionism.


๐Ÿ”น 6. Automobile Industry (to some extent)

Why it’s protected:

  • Regulatory barriers, tariffs (especially under Trump), and local production incentives.

  • “Buy American” provisions for government fleet procurement.

Why it wouldn’t survive freely:

  • U.S.-based manufacturers struggle against Japanese, Korean, and now Chinese EV producers on cost and innovation metrics.

  • If all barriers were lifted, especially on electric vehicles, U.S. firms could lose substantial domestic market share.


๐Ÿ”น 7. Defense Industry

Why it’s protected:

  • Virtually all defense procurement is restricted to U.S. manufacturers (Buy American laws).

  • Massive R&D subsidies and cost-plus contracts.

Why it wouldn’t survive freely:

  • Defense products from Israel, France, and even South Korea might outcompete U.S. systems on price or innovation in a level market.

  • Security considerations, however, make free trade in this sector unlikely or even undesirable.


๐Ÿ”น 8. Pharmaceuticals (in terms of global price protection)

Why it’s protected:

  • U.S. consumers pay significantly more than citizens of other nations for the same drugs due to lack of price controls.

  • Patent protections are vigorously enforced.

Why it wouldn’t survive freely:

  • In a free-trade model where drug prices were harmonized globally, many U.S. pharma firms would see revenues shrink dramatically.

  • Off-patent drugs from India and generics from Canada would dominate.


๐Ÿงญ Conclusion: What Would Survive?

  • Tech, finance, higher education, aerospace, entertainment (Hollywood), and high-end services are globally competitive and would likely thrive or even dominate in a fully liberalized world economy.

  • Industries relying on subsidies, tariffs, or regulatory capture would need to drastically restructure—or disappear.





In a truly free trade global architecture—where there are no subsidies, tariffs, non-tariff barriers, or state-backed advantages—several key sectors of the Chinese economy would face severe challenges or even collapse. These sectors currently rely heavily on state support, market protection, and regulatory insulation from global competition.

Below is a comprehensive analysis of the most protected and vulnerable sectors of the Chinese economy:


๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ Protected Chinese Sectors Vulnerable Under Free Trade

๐Ÿ”น 1. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) Across Heavy Industry

Why they’re protected:

  • Direct government ownership and subsidies.

  • Cheap state financing via state banks.

  • Guaranteed market share via government contracts.

Why they’d struggle in free trade:

  • Low productivity, inefficient operations, and overcapacity.

  • Unable to compete with private-sector efficiency from abroad.

  • Many exist purely for employment stability, not profitability.

Examples:

  • Steel (e.g., Baowu Steel)

  • Coal and oil refining

  • Chemicals and cement


๐Ÿ”น 2. Steel, Aluminum, and Cement

Why they’re protected:

  • Heavily subsidized energy inputs (coal, electricity).

  • Export rebates, VAT waivers, and financial lifelines.

  • Domestic preference policies and tariff protections.

Why they’d struggle freely:

  • Chronic overproduction.

  • High pollution costs in a carbon-priced world.

  • Global overcapacity and cheaper producers (e.g., India, Vietnam).


๐Ÿ”น 3. Electric Vehicles (EVs) and Green Tech Manufacturing

Why they’re protected:

  • Tens of billions in subsidies (both production and consumer-side).

  • Mandates for local governments to procure domestic EVs.

  • Preferential treatment in licensing and registration.

Why they’d struggle freely:

  • Without subsidies and state mandates, many EV brands would collapse.

  • Over 100 EV brands exist, but only a few (like BYD) are globally competitive.

  • Tesla and global automakers would dominate purely market-based systems.


๐Ÿ”น 4. Solar Panels and Wind Turbines

Why they’re protected:

  • Subsidies for manufacturers and land leases.

  • Export support (cheap credit, tax rebates).

  • Weak enforcement of IP protections.

Why they’d struggle freely:

  • Accusations of dumping and labor abuse would lead to reputational loss.

  • Higher input costs in non-subsidized global system.

  • Competitors from the U.S., EU, and India would reclaim lost ground.


๐Ÿ”น 5. Agriculture (especially grains, pork, and rice)

Why they’re protected:

  • Massive subsidies and floor pricing.

  • Tariff barriers (e.g., grain quotas, dairy restrictions).

  • State reserves buy excess output.

Why they’d struggle freely:

  • Chinese agriculture is often less productive due to fragmented land and water scarcity.

  • The U.S., Brazil, and Australia would undercut Chinese prices across grains, beef, and dairy.


๐Ÿ”น 6. Banking and Finance

Why they’re protected:

  • Dominated by state-owned banks.

  • Capital controls prevent competition.

  • Foreign financial institutions face regulatory red tape.

Why they’d struggle freely:

  • Foreign banks are far more efficient, innovative, and globally experienced.

  • Poor loan quality and high exposure to zombie companies would be exposed in a competitive environment.


๐Ÿ”น 7. High-Speed Rail Construction and Operation

Why they’re protected:

  • Funded through massive state debt and land financing models.

  • Unprofitable routes are kept alive by public spending.

Why they’d struggle freely:

  • Without state guarantees, most rail projects would be financially unsustainable.

  • Global bidding would expose cost inefficiencies.


๐Ÿ”น 8. Semiconductors (Most Domestic Manufacturers)

Why they’re protected:

  • Heavily subsidized by state and local governments.

  • Forced tech transfer policies and industrial espionage allegations.

  • National security labeling prevents foreign competition in domestic procurement.

Why they’d struggle freely:

  • China still lags behind in advanced chips (7nm and below).

  • Taiwanese, Korean, and U.S. firms dominate cutting-edge fabs.

  • In a free trade system with equal IP enforcement and no state aid, China’s chip sector would regress.


๐Ÿ”ธ Sectors Likely to Survive and Thrive

Despite the above, some Chinese sectors are globally competitive and would do well in a free trade architecture:

  • Consumer electronics (e.g., Xiaomi, Lenovo)

  • E-commerce platforms (e.g., Alibaba, Shein, Temu/Pinduoduo)

  • Logistics and shipping (e.g., COSCO)

  • Online services (e.g., TikTok/Bytedance internationally)

  • Infrastructure construction (Belt & Road–related engineering firms)


๐Ÿงญ Final Takeaway: China's Achilles Heels in Free Trade

China’s economic model has historically combined state capitalism with mercantilist trade policy, resulting in:

  • Overcapacity across sectors

  • Heavy reliance on state-backed credit

  • Protection of inefficient players for stability

A sudden shift to pure free trade would force a painful reckoning:

  • Many zombie firms would collapse.

  • Industrial overcapacity would flood global markets initially, then implode domestically.

  • Politically sensitive sectors like agriculture and SOEs would become unstable.





Yes — the free trade doctrine as classically understood, particularly through David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, begins to break down or require serious qualifications when applied to the real-world complexities of modern global trade. The pure theory presumes conditions that rarely hold true, leading to distortions, backlash, and increasing calls for strategic trade policies.

Let’s explore where Ricardo’s elegant logic meets modern reality—and where it begins to fray.


๐Ÿ” Ricardo’s Comparative Advantage: The Ideal

David Ricardo’s core insight (1817):

Even if one country is more efficient in producing everything, mutual gains from trade are possible if each country specializes in what it produces relatively more efficiently.

Assumptions behind the theory:

  • Perfect competition

  • No externalities

  • Capital and labor are immobile between countries

  • Governments don’t interfere with trade

  • All nations play by the same rules

  • Technology is constant or diffuses equally


๐Ÿšง Where It Breaks Down

1. Strategic Trade and Geopolitics

  • Countries don’t just want to "trade" — they want to control key technologies (e.g., semiconductors, AI, 5G).

  • National security trumps free trade logic: chips, energy, critical minerals.

  • Free trade with a geopolitical rival becomes a vulnerability, not a strength.

Example:
The U.S. can’t rely on China for rare earths or advanced chips, even if China is cheaper.


2. Asymmetrical State Capitalism

  • Ricardo didn’t foresee large states like China deploying:

    • Massive subsidies

    • SOEs with unlimited capital

    • Forced technology transfers

    • Currency manipulation

    • Data localization laws

  • These distort global prices, break level playing fields, and make comparative advantage artificial.


3. Capital Mobility & Offshoring

  • In Ricardo’s world, capital stays at home. In reality, it moves to the lowest-cost, least-regulated environment.

  • Result: hollowed-out industrial bases, job losses, social instability in advanced economies.

Example:
U.S. manufacturing moved en masse to China—not because China had the best relative advantage, but because capital sought absolute cost savings and regulatory arbitrage.


4. Environmental and Labor Externalities

  • Ricardo didn’t price carbon, pollution, or worker rights.

  • If one country allows slave labor, child labor, or ecological destruction, it can dominate industries unfairly.

Result:
Race to the bottom in labor and environmental standards — not a fair playing field.


5. Unequal Technological Diffusion

  • In free trade theory, technology is static or equally shared.

  • But IP protections, technological monopolies, and deliberate hoarding (e.g., chip lithography machines) prevent true global diffusion, cementing global inequality.


6. Resilience vs. Efficiency

  • Free trade maximizes efficiency, not resilience.

  • COVID, the Ukraine war, and geopolitical risks have exposed the fragility of lean, just-in-time global supply chains.

Now countries ask:
"Can we make it at home—even at a loss?"


7. Distributional Consequences Ignored

  • Ricardo’s model assumes everyone in each country shares in the benefits of trade.

  • In reality, trade produces winners and losers:

    • Displaced workers in the Rust Belt

    • Billionaires in tech and finance

  • Without redistribution or re-skilling, inequality soars, fueling political backlash (e.g., Brexit, Trump, protectionism).


๐Ÿงญ So, Does Free Trade Still Have a Place?

Yes, but with caveats:

Free Trade Principle Real-World Adjustment
Specialize by advantage ...but secure strategic sectors
Open markets ...but ensure reciprocity
Price signals allocate ...but adjust for carbon, labor costs
Deregulate and liberalize ...but build domestic resilience
Global integration ...but avoid dependence on adversaries

๐Ÿง  Toward a Post-Ricardian Doctrine

What we may need is not to abandon Ricardo, but to modernize his framework:

  • Add strategic trade theory (Krugman, Brander-Spencer)

  • Account for externalities, resilience, inequality

  • Prioritize reciprocity, fairness, and geopolitical alignment

  • Replace “free trade” absolutism with smart, conditional trade


๐Ÿงฉ Bottom Line

Free trade is not dead. But it is no longer pure.

David Ricardo’s insights remain powerful in theory—but in practice, nations don’t operate like idealized market agents. They act politically, strategically, and defensively.

Thus, a revised doctrine of conditional or strategic trade—especially among trusted partners—may be the more viable architecture for global commerce in the 21st century.




Wednesday, July 02, 2025

Why Tariffs Are a Bad Idea — Even When They Raise Money



 


Why Tariffs Are a Bad Idea — Even When They Raise Money

In the world of economic policy, few ideas are as persistent — and as misleading — as tariffs. Often sold as a way to protect domestic industries and generate government revenue, tariffs are, in truth, a drag on growth, innovation, and everyday affordability. And the math doesn’t lie: even when tariffs bring in billions, the economic damage they cause outweighs any revenue gains.

It’s time to call it clearly — tariffs are bad economics. So bad, in fact, that countries would be better off unilaterally reducing their own tariffs — even if other countries don’t reciprocate. Let’s break down why.


The Illusion of Revenue: $30B a Month, But at What Cost?

Let’s say the U.S. government imposes tariffs that bring in $30 billion per month, or $360 billion per year. Sounds like a windfall, right?

But consider this: the U.S. GDP is approximately $30 trillion. A 1% drop in GDP—caused by disruptions to trade, higher input costs, inflation, and retaliation—translates to a $300 billion loss in total economic output.

So even if tariffs “earn” $360 billion, they may be causing a $300 billion loss in growth. That’s a razor-thin $60 billion difference — and it vanishes the moment you account for rising prices, lost jobs, delayed investments, and reduced tax revenues elsewhere in the economy.


Tariffs Feed Inflation

When tariffs raise the cost of imported goods, they ripple through the economy in the form of higher prices for consumers and businesses. Everything from electronics to construction materials to food gets more expensive.

Inflation eats into wages and savings, driving up the cost of living. Central banks respond by raising interest rates, which increases borrowing costs for mortgages, cars, and business expansion. Tariffs become an indirect tax on the entire population — especially the working class and small businesses.


Small Businesses and Manufacturers Take the Hit

Many small and medium-sized American businesses rely on imported materials or components to produce their goods. When tariffs make those imports more expensive, margins shrink. Small businesses don’t have the pricing power of giant corporations, so they are forced to absorb losses, cut staff, or shut down entirely.

Even domestic manufacturers, the supposed “winners” of tariffs, often get hurt. Why? Because they depend on global supply chains. They import machinery, electronics, and raw materials to build their final products. Tariffs disrupt those flows and raise their costs, making their products less competitive both at home and abroad.


Lost Tax Revenues and Reduced Investment

Tariffs aren’t just bad for businesses — they’re bad for government budgets too.

When GDP growth slows by even 1%, the government loses billions in tax revenue:

  • Lower business profits → less corporate tax

  • Fewer jobs or wage growth → less income tax

  • Reduced consumer spending → less sales tax

Meanwhile, uncertainty caused by tariffs makes companies delay or cancel investments. No one wants to build a factory when global supply chains are unpredictable. Capital that could have gone to innovation sits idle.


What the Economists Say: A Rare Consensus

In an era where economists often disagree, the consensus on tariffs is overwhelming: they are inefficient, distortionary, and harmful to long-term prosperity.

  • A 2018 survey of top U.S. economists by the University of Chicago found zero who agreed that tariffs improve domestic welfare.

  • Nobel laureate Paul Krugman has called tariffs “an exercise in self-harm.”

  • The Peterson Institute for International Economics estimates that the Trump-era tariffs cost American consumers $57 billion annually, while saving only a tiny fraction of jobs — at a cost of millions of dollars per job saved.


The Case for Unilateral Tariff Reduction

What if the U.S. reduced or eliminated tariffs — even if other countries didn’t?

It turns out that’s still a smart move. Why?

  • Cheaper imports benefit consumers and businesses.

  • Lower production costs make U.S. companies more competitive globally.

  • Efficiency gains allow industries to specialize and scale.

  • Greater openness encourages innovation, collaboration, and investment.

This is not a fringe view. Countries like Singapore and Hong Kong have long practiced near-zero tariffs and have thrived. The U.K., post-Brexit, has lowered tariffs on numerous goods to reduce inflation and improve supply chains, regardless of what trading partners do.

When a country opens its economy, it helps itself first — and creates a positive ripple effect for global trade.


Conclusion: Tariffs Are Taxes That Hurt Us All

Tariffs may raise money for the government, but they do so by making life more expensive, hurting small businesses, and slowing the economy. They are a tax in disguise — a tax on every imported good, every consumer, and every company trying to grow and compete.

The evidence is clear. The economic logic is clear. The global experience is clear.

It’s time to move beyond protectionist fantasies and embrace what works:

Open trade, lower tariffs, stronger growth.

Even if other countries don’t follow suit — we should lead.





เค•्เคฏों เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เคเค• เคฌुเคฐा เคตिเคšाเคฐ เคนैं — เคญเคฒे เคนी เคตे เคธเคฐเค•ाเคฐ เค•े เคฒिเค เคชैเคธे เคฒाเคँ

เค†เคฐ्เคฅिเค• เคจीเคคिเคฏों เค•ी เคฆुเคจिเคฏा เคฎें เคถाเคฏเคฆ เคนी เค•ोเคˆ เคตिเคšाเคฐ เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เคœिเคคเคจा เคชुเคฐाเคจा เค”เคฐ เค‰เคคเคจा เคนी เค—ुเคฎเคฐाเคน เค•เคฐเคจे เคตाเคฒा เคนो। เค…เค•्เคธเคฐ เค‡เคจ्เคนें เค˜เคฐेเคฒू เค‰เคฆ्เคฏोเค—ों เค•ी เคฐเค•्เคทा เค•เคฐเคจे เค”เคฐ เคธเคฐเค•ाเคฐी เคฐाเคœเคธ्เคต เคฌเคข़ाเคจे เค•े เคคเคฐीเค•े เค•े เคฐूเคช เคฎें เคชेเคถ เค•िเคฏा เคœाเคคा เคนै, เคฒेเค•िเคจ เคตाเคธ्เคคเคต เคฎें เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เคตिเค•ाเคธ, เคจเคตाเคšाเคฐ เค”เคฐ เคฐोเคœเคฎเคฐ्เคฐा เค•ी เคšीเคœों เค•ी เค•िเคซाเคฏเคคी เค‰เคชเคฒเคฌ्เคงเคคा เค•ो เคจुเค•เคธाเคจ เคชเคนुंเคšाเคคे เคนैं। เค”เคฐ เค—เคฃिเคค เคคो เคฌिเคฒ्เค•ुเคฒ เคธाเคซ เคนै: เคญเคฒे เคนी เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เค…เคฐเคฌों เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เคœुเคŸाเคँ, เคตे เค‰เคธเคธे เค•เคนीं เค…เคงिเค• เค†เคฐ्เคฅिเค• เคจुเค•เคธाเคจ เคชเคนुंเคšाเคคे เคนैं।

เคธเคš्เคšाเคˆ เคฏเคน เคนै เค•ि เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เค–เคฐाเคฌ เค…เคฐ्เคฅเคถाเคธ्เคค्เคฐ เคนैं। เค‡เคคเคจे เค–เคฐाเคฌ เค•ि เคฆेเคถ เค…เคชเคจे เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เค–ुเคฆ เคนी เค•เคฎ เค•เคฐ เคฒें — เคญเคฒे เคนी เคฆूเคธเคฐे เคฆेเคถ เคเคธा เคจ เค•เคฐें — เคซिเคฐ เคญी เค‰เคจเค•ा เคฒाเคญ เคนोเคคा เคนै। เค†เค‡เค เคธเคฎเคเคคे เคนैं เค•्เคฏों।


เค†เคฎเคฆเคจी เค•ा เคญ्เคฐเคฎ: เคนเคฐ เคฎเคนीเคจे $30 เคฌिเคฒिเคฏเคจ, เคฒेเค•िเคจ เค•िเคธ เค•ीเคฎเคค เคชเคฐ?

เคฎाเคจ เคฒीเคœिเค เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ी เคธเคฐเค•ाเคฐ เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เคธे เคนเคฐ เคฎเคนीเคจे $30 เคฌिเคฒिเคฏเคจ เคœुเคŸा เคฐเคนी เคนै — เคฏाเคจी เคธाเคฒाเคจा $360 เคฌिเคฒिเคฏเคจ

เคฌिเคฒ्เค•ुเคฒ เคซाเคฏเคฆे เค•ा เคธौเคฆा เคฒเค—เคคा เคนै, เคนै เคจा?

เคฒेเค•िเคจ เคธोเคšिเค: เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค•ी GDP เคฒเค—เคญเค— $30 เคŸ्เคฐिเคฒिเคฏเคจ เคนै। เค…เค—เคฐ เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เค”เคฐ เค‰เคธเคธे เคชैเคฆा เคนुเคˆ เค†เคฐ्เคฅिเค• เค…เคจिเคถ्เคšिเคคเคคा เค•े เคšเคฒเคคे GDP 1% เค•เคฎ เคนो เคœाเค, เคคो เค‡เคธเค•ा เคฎเคคเคฒเคฌ เคนै $300 เคฌिเคฒिเคฏเคจ เค•ा เคจुเค•เคธाเคจ

เคคो เคญเคฒे เคนी เคŸैเคฐिเคซ $360B เคฒा เคฐเคนे เคนों, เค…เค—เคฐ $300B เค•ी เคตिเค•ाเคธ เคฆเคฐ เค›िเคจ เคœाเค, เคคो เค…เคธเคฒी "เคซाเคฏเคฆा" เคธिเคฐ्เคซ $60 เคฌिเคฒिเคฏเคจ เค•ा เคฌเคšเคคा เคนै — เค”เคฐ เคฏเคน เคญी เค›เคฒाเคตा เคนै เคœเคฌ เคนเคฎ เคฆेเค–ें เค•ि เค‡เคธเคธे เค•ीเคฎเคคें เคฌเคข़เคคी เคนैं, เคฐोเคœเค—ाเคฐ เคœाเคคे เคนैं, เคจिเคตेเคถ เคฐुเค•เคคा เคนै เค”เคฐ เคฆूเคธเคฐे เคŸैเค•्เคธ เค•เคฎ เคนोเคคे เคนैं


เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เคฎเคนंเค—ाเคˆ เคฌเคข़ाเคคे เคนैं

เคœเคฌ เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เค†เคฏाเคคिเคค เคธाเคฎाเคจ เค•ी เคฒाเค—เคค เคฌเคข़ा เคฆेเคคे เคนैं, เคคो เค‰เคธเค•ा เค…เคธเคฐ เคชूเคฐे เคฌाเคœाเคฐ เคชเคฐ เคชเคก़เคคा เคนै — เค‰เคชเคญोเค•्เคคाเค“ं เค”เคฐ เคต्เคฏเคตเคธाเคฏों เคฆोเคจों เคชเคฐ

เคนเคฐ เคšीเคœ เคฎเคนंเค—ी เคนो เคœाเคคी เคนै: เค‡เคฒेเค•्เคŸ्เคฐॉเคจिเค•्เคธ, เคฎเคถीเคจเคฐी, เคจिเคฐ्เคฎाเคฃ เคธाเคฎเค—्เคฐी เค”เคฐ เคฏเคนाँ เคคเค• เค•ि เค–ाเคฆ्เคฏ เคตเคธ्เคคुเคँ เคญी।

เค‡เคธเคธे เคฎเคนंเค—ाเคˆ เคฌเคข़เคคी เคนै, เคœिเคธเคธे เคฒोเค—ों เค•ी เค–เคฐीเคฆเคจे เค•ी เคถเค•्เคคि เค˜เคŸเคคी เคนै। เคซिเคฐ เคฌ्เคฏाเคœ เคฆเคฐें เคฌเคข़เคคी เคนैं, เคœिเคธเคธे เคฎเค•ाเคจ เค–เคฐीเคฆเคจा, เค—ाเคก़ी เคฒेเคจा เค”เคฐ เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐ เคถुเคฐू เค•เคฐเคจा เค”เคฐ เคฎुเคถ्เค•िเคฒ เคนो เคœाเคคा เคนै।


เค›ोเคŸे เคต्เคฏเคตเคธाเคฏों เค”เคฐ เคฎैเคจ्เคฏुเคซैเค•्เคšเคฐिंเค— เค•ो เคเคŸเค•ा

เค•เคˆ เค›ोเคŸे เค”เคฐ เคฎเคง्เคฏเคฎ เคต्เคฏเคตเคธाเคฏ เค†เคฏाเคคिเคค เค•เคš्เคšे เคฎाเคฒ เคชเคฐ เคจिเคฐ्เคญเคฐ เค•เคฐเคคे เคนैं। เคœเคฌ เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เค•ी เคตเคœเคน เคธे เคฏे เคฎเคนंเค—े เคนो เคœाเคคे เคนैं, เคคो เคฎुเคจाเคซा เค˜เคŸเคคा เคนै। เค›ोเคŸे เคต्เคฏเคตเคธाเคฏों เค•े เคชाเคธ เค•ीเคฎเคคें เคฌเคข़ाเคจे เค•ी เค•्เคทเคฎเคคा เคจเคนीं เคนोเคคी, เค‡เคธเคฒिเค เค‰เคจ्เคนें เคจुเค•เคธाเคจ เคेเคฒเคจा เคชเคก़เคคा เคนै, เค•เคฐ्เคฎเคšाเคฐिเคฏों เค•ो เคนเคŸाเคจा เคชเคก़เคคा เคนै, เคฏा เคฌंเคฆ เคนी เค•เคฐเคจा เคชเคก़เคคा เคนै।

เคฏเคนाँ เคคเค• เค•ि เค˜เคฐेเคฒू เคจिเคฐ्เคฎाเคคा เคญी เคช्เคฐเคญाเคตिเคค เคนोเคคे เคนैं, เค•्เคฏोंเค•ि เค‰เคจเค•े เคธเคช्เคฒाเคˆ เคšेเคจ เคญी เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เคนोเคคे เคนैं। เค…เค—เคฐ เค†เคฏाเคคिเคค เคชाเคฐ्เคŸ्เคธ เคฎเคนंเค—े เคนो เคœाเคँ, เคคो เค‰เคจเค•े เค‰เคค्เคชाเคฆ เคญी เคฎเคนंเค—े เคนो เคœाเคคे เคนैं — เคœिเคธเคธे เคตिเคฆेเคถों เคฎें เคช्เคฐเคคिเคธ्เคชเคฐ्เคงा เค•เคฐเคจा เคฎुเคถ्เค•िเคฒ เคนो เคœाเคคा เคนै


เคŸैเค•्เคธ เค•ी เคนाเคจि เค”เคฐ เคจिเคตेเคถ เคฎें เค—िเคฐाเคตเคŸ

เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เคธे เคธिเคฐ्เคซ เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐ เค•ो เคนी เคจเคนीं, เคธเคฐเค•ाเคฐी เคŸैเค•्เคธ เคธिเคธ्เคŸเคฎ เค•ो เคญी เคจुเค•เคธाเคจ เคนोเคคा เคนै।

เคœैเคธे เคนी GDP เคงीเคฎी เคนोเคคी เคนै, เคธเคฐเค•ाเคฐ เค•ो เค‡เคจ เคธ्เคฐोเคคों เคธे เคŸैเค•्เคธ เค•เคฎ เคฎिเคฒเคคे เคนैं:

  • เค•เคฎ เคฎुเคจाเคซा → เค•เคฎ เค•ॉเคฐ्เคชोเคฐेเคŸ เคŸैเค•्เคธ

  • เค•เคฎ เคตेเคคเคจ เคฏा เคจौเค•เคฐिเคฏाँ → เค•เคฎ เค‡เคจเค•เคฎ เคŸैเค•्เคธ

  • เค•เคฎ เค–เคฐीเคฆाเคฐी → เค•เคฎ เคธेเคฒ्เคธ เคŸैเค•्เคธ

เค‰เคงเคฐ, เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เคธे เคชैเคฆा เคนुเคˆ เค…เคจिเคถ्เคšिเคคเคคा เค•े เค•ाเคฐเคฃ เค•ंเคชเคจिเคฏाँ เคจिเคตेเคถ เคŸाเคฒ เคฆेเคคी เคนैं। เค•ोเคˆ เคญी เค•ंเคชเคจी เคเคธी เคธ्เคฅिเคคि เคฎें เคจเคฏा เคช्เคฒांเคŸ เคจเคนीं เคฒเค—ाเคจा เคšाเคนเคคी เคœเคฌ เค‰เคธे เคจเคนीं เคชเคคा เค•ि เค…เค—เคฒे เคธाเคฒ เค•ौเคจ เคธी เคšीเคœ़ เคชเคฐ เคŸैเค•्เคธ เคฒเค—เคจे เคตाเคฒा เคนै।


เค…เคฐ्เคฅเคถाเคธ्เคค्เคฐिเคฏों เค•ी เคฐाเคฏ: เคฆुเคฐ्เคฒเคญ เคธเคนเคฎเคคि

เค†เคœ เค•े เคœ़เคฎाเคจे เคฎें เคœเคฌ เค…เคงिเค•ांเคถ เค…เคฐ्เคฅเคถाเคธ्เคค्เคฐिเคฏों เคฎें เคธเคนเคฎเคคि เคฆुเคฐ्เคฒเคญ เคนै, เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เคชเคฐ เค…เคฆ्เคญुเคค เคธเคนเคฎเคคि เคนै:
เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เคจुเค•เคธाเคจเคฆेเคน เคนैं — เคตे เคฌाเคœाเคฐ เค•ो เคฌिเค—ाเคก़เคคे เคนैं, เค•ुเคถเคฒเคคा เค˜เคŸाเคคे เคนैं, เค”เคฐ เค‰เคชเคญोเค•्เคคाเค“ं เค•ो เคšोเคŸ เคชเคนुंเคšाเคคे เคนैं।

  • เคถिเค•ाเค—ो เคตिเคถ्เคตเคตिเคฆ्เคฏाเคฒเคฏ เค•ी เคเค• เคธเคฐ्เคตे เคฎें เคเค• เคญी เค…เคฐ्เคฅเคถाเคธ्เคค्เคฐी เคจे เคฏเคน เคจเคนीं เค•เคนा เค•ि เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เคธे เคœเคจเคคा เค•ा เคญเคฒा เคนोเคคा เคนै।

  • เคจोเคฌेเคฒ เคชुเคฐเคธ्เค•ाเคฐ เคตिเคœेเคคा เคชॉเคฒ เค•्เคฐुเค—เคฎैเคจ เคจे เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เค•ो “เค†เคค्เคฎ-เคนเคค्เคฏा เคœैเคธा เค•เคฆเคฎ” เค•เคนा เคนै।

  • เคชीเคŸเคฐเคธเคจ เค‡ंเคธ्เคŸिเคŸ्เคฏूเคŸ เค•े เค…เคจुเคธाเคฐ, เคŸ्เคฐเคฎ्เคช เคฏुเค— เค•े เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เคจे เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ी เค‰เคชเคญोเค•्เคคाเค“ं เค•ो เคนเคฐ เคธाเคฒ $57 เคฌिเคฒिเคฏเคจ เค•ा เคจुเค•เคธाเคจ เคชเคนुंเคšाเคฏा, เค”เคฐ เคนเคฐ เคเค• เคจौเค•เคฐी เคฌเคšाเคจे เคฎें เคฒाเค–ों เคกॉเคฒเคฐ เค–เคฐ्เคš เคนुเค।


เคเค•เคคเคฐเคซा เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เค•เคŸौเคคी เคญी เคธเคฎเคเคฆाเคฐी เคนै

เค•्เคฏा เคนो เค…เค—เคฐ เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ा เค…เคชเคจे เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เค–ुเคฆ เคนी เค˜เคŸा เคฆे, เคญเคฒे เคนी เคฆूเคธเคฐा เคฆेเคถ เคเคธा เคจ เค•เคฐे?

เคฏเคน เคญी เคซाเคฏเคฆेเคฎंเคฆ เคนै। เค•्เคฏों?

  • เคธเคธ्เคคे เค†เคฏाเคค เคธे เค‰เคชเคญोเค•्เคคा เค”เคฐ เค•ाเคฐोเคฌाเคฐी เคฆोเคจों เค•ो เคฐाเคนเคค เคฎिเคฒเคคी เคนै।

  • เค•เคฎ เคฒाเค—เคค เคธे เค…เคฎेเคฐिเค•ी เค•ंเคชเคจिเคฏाँ เคœ्เคฏाเคฆा เคช्เคฐเคคिเคธ्เคชเคฐ्เคงी เคฌเคจเคคी เคนैं।

  • เคฌेเคนเคคเคฐ เคฆเค•्เคทเคคा เคธे เค‰เคฆ्เคฏोเค—ों เค•ो เคฌเคก़ा เคนोเคจे เค”เคฐ เคตिเค•เคธिเคค เคนोเคจे เค•ा เคฎौเค•ा เคฎिเคฒเคคा เคนै।

  • เค–ुเคฒेเคชเคจ เคธे เคจเคตाเคšाเคฐ, เคธाเคेเคฆाเคฐी เค”เคฐ เคจिเคตेเคถ เคฌเคข़เคคा เคนै।

เคธिंเค—ाเคชुเคฐ, เคนांเค—เค•ांเค— เคœैเคธे เคฆेเคถों เคจे เคฒंเคฌे เคธเคฎเคฏ เคธे เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เค•เคฎ เคฐเค–े เคนैं — เค”เคฐ เค‰เคจ्เคนोंเคจे เคฌเคนुเคค เคซाเคฏเคฆा เคฆेเค–ा เคนै।


เคจिเคท्เค•เคฐ्เคท: เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เคเค• เค›िเคชा เคนुเค† เคŸैเค•्เคธ เคนै เคœो เคธเคญी เค•ो เคจुเค•เคธाเคจ เคฆेเคคा เคนै

เคŸैเคฐिเคซ เคธเคฐเค•ाเคฐ เค•े เคฒिเค เคชैเคธा เคฒा เคธเค•เคคे เคนैं, เคฒेเค•िเคจ เคฏเคน เคชैเคธा เคœ्เคฏाเคฆा เคฎเคนंเค—े เคธाเคฎाเคจ, เค†เคฐ्เคฅिเค• เคฎंเคฆी เค”เคฐ เค›ंเคŸเคจिเคฏों เค•ी เค•ीเคฎเคค เคชเคฐ เค†เคคा เคนै। เคฏเคน เคเค• เค›ुเคชा เคนुเค† เคŸैเค•्เคธ เคนै — เคนเคฐ เค‰เคชเคญोเค•्เคคा, เคนเคฐ เค›ोเคŸे เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐी เค”เคฐ เคนเคฐ เค‰เคค्เคชाเคฆเค• เคชเคฐ।

เคคเคฅ्เคฏ เคธाเคซ เคนैं। เค—เคฃिเคค เคธाเคซ เคนै। เคตैเคถ्เคตिเค• เค…เคจुเคญเคต เคญी เคธाเคซ เคนै।

เค…เคฌ เคธเคฎเคฏ เคนै เค•ि เคนเคฎ เคช्เคฐोเคŸेเค•्เคถเคจिเคœ़्เคฎ เค•े เค‡เคธ เคूเค  เคธे เคฌाเคนเคฐ เค†เคँ เค”เคฐ เค‰เคธ เคฆिเคถा เคฎें เคœाเคँ เคœो เคตाเคธ्เคคเคต เคฎें เค•ाเคฎ เค•เคฐเคคी เคนै:

เค–ुเคฒा เคต्เคฏाเคชाเคฐ, เค•เคฎ เคŸैเคฐिเคซ, เคคेเคœ़ เคตिเค•ाเคธ।

เคšाเคนे เคฌाเค•ी เคฆेเคถ เคธाเคฅ เคจ เคฆें — เคนเคฎें เคจेเคคृเคค्เคต เค•เคฐเคจा เคšाเคนिเค।





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Trump's policies already cost US companies $82 billion — and that could 'more than double' tariffs and mass deportations will hurt American businesses and that the draconian Medicaid and SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) cuts in his megabill will imperil vulnerable Americans. ........ Trump's tariffs "add about $82 billion in total new costs for all mid-sized U.S. companies, per a new estimate — a sum that would more than double if rates return to levels seen at the height of trade tensions in April." ........ Those tariff-related expenses, according to Brown, "could force" business owners "to shrink costs elsewhere, perhaps via layoffs." ....... "The cost amounts to 3 percent of their payroll — it's meaningful that they are paying that much to compensate for the tariffs." ...... Trump's "immigration crackdown is hitting key pockets of the economy, disrupting workplaces and communities around the country." ......... The sharp fall in immigration this year threatens to slow down economic growth, particularly in the sectors and cities that relied on newcomers to the U.S. in recent years…. There will be fewer workers to produce goods and services, slowing down growth and putting pressure on wages." ......... the U.S. economy "will find itself slightly diminished in the long run, and inflation will run a touch higher." ....... The 'big, beautiful bill' that passed the Senate contains about $175 billion for even more immigration enforcement.

Monday, June 02, 2025

Why Paul Krugman Thinks Trump’s Trade War is “Stupid and Self-Destructive”

 

Paul Krugman, a Nobel Prize-winning economist, has been vocal in his criticism of Donald Trump’s tariff policies, describing them as “stupid and self-destructive” for several reasons rooted in economic theory and evidence. Below, we will break down why Krugman holds this view, assess whether it reflects a broader consensus among U.S. economists, and explain the underlying reasoning.

Why Paul Krugman Thinks Trump’s Trade War is “Stupid and Self-Destructive”
  1. Economic Disruption from High Tariffs:
    • Krugman argues that Trump’s tariffs, which include proposals for 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico and up to 145% (later reduced to 30%) on Chinese goods, represent a massive shock to the global economy. These tariffs are significantly higher than historical precedents like the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, especially given that international trade is now three times more important to the global economy than it was then.
    • High tariffs raise the cost of imported goods, which increases prices for consumers and businesses. This can lead to inflation, reduced purchasing power, and higher production costs, particularly in industries reliant on global supply chains, such as North American auto manufacturing, where components cross borders multiple times.
  2. Misguided Focus on Trade Deficits:
    • Krugman dismisses Trump’s fixation on bilateral trade deficits (e.g., with Canada or China) as “junk economics.” He argues that trade deficits with individual countries are not inherently harmful and are a natural part of global trade. For example, the U.S. trade deficit with Canada is largely due to oil and hydropower imports, which benefit both economies. Tariffs aimed at reducing these deficits disrupt efficient trade patterns without addressing the root causes, which are tied to macroeconomic factors like capital flows and domestic savings rates, not trade policy alone.
  3. Lack of Strategic Coherence:
    • Krugman sees no consistent strategy in Trump’s tariff policies. He notes contradictions in the justifications provided, such as re-industrializing America versus using tariffs as a negotiating tool for reciprocity or fentanyl enforcement. For instance, re-industrialization would require stable, long-term tariffs, but Trump’s policies are erratic, with rates and targets shifting unpredictably (e.g., a pause on Canada/Mexico tariffs or a reduction in China tariffs from 145% to 30%). This unpredictability creates uncertainty, deterring business investment and risking recession.
    • He also questions the legal basis for tariffs, suggesting they may violate trade agreements like the USMCA (NAFTA’s successor) and could face court challenges, further undermining their effectiveness.
  4. Fentanyl as a Pretext:
    • Krugman argues that Trump’s claim of imposing tariffs to address the fentanyl crisis is a pretext, not a genuine strategy. He notes that fentanyl smuggling primarily occurs through individual border crossings, not large-scale trade shipments affected by tariffs. For example, Canada is not a major source of fentanyl, and tariffs on goods like cars or electronics do not target smuggling routes. This disconnect suggests the fentanyl rationale is a politically convenient excuse for protectionist policies driven by other motives, like asserting dominance or appealing to a mercantilist worldview.
  5. Risk of Retaliation and Global Trade Damage:
    • Krugman warns that Trump’s tariffs invite retaliation from trading partners, potentially sparking a global trade war. Other countries, facing economic harm, are likely to impose counter-tariffs, as seen in Trump’s first term but on a larger scale now. This could disrupt global supply chains and reduce international trade by as much as 50%, with U.S. trade with China potentially dropping by 65% even after the tariff reduction to 30%. Such a collapse would harm both the U.S. and global economies.
    • The tariffs also undermine U.S. credibility in international agreements. By ignoring commitments like the USMCA, Trump signals that U.S. trade deals are unreliable, which could deter future cooperation and investment.
  6. Economic Costs Outweigh Benefits:
    • Krugman argues that tariffs will not achieve Trump’s stated goals, such as boosting U.S. manufacturing or reducing trade deficits. Instead, they raise costs for U.S. businesses and consumers, potentially causing stagflation (high inflation combined with economic stagnation). For example, the Peterson Institute estimates that Trump’s tariffs could disproportionately burden the bottom 80% of Americans through higher prices.
    • The U.S. economy, near full employment (4.1% unemployment), lacks the labor capacity to rapidly expand manufacturing, especially if combined with Trump’s proposed mass deportations, which would shrink the workforce.
  7. Policy Process as “Malignant Stupidity”:
    • Krugman criticizes the chaotic and uninformed process behind Trump’s tariff decisions, describing it as “malignant stupidity.” He points to Trump’s false claims about trading partners’ tariff rates and the lack of consultation with economists or business leaders. The erratic nature of announcements (e.g., sudden tariff pauses or exemptions) reflects a lack of rigorous analysis, increasing market volatility and economic uncertainty.
Is This a General Consensus Among U.S. Economists?
While Krugman’s views are strongly worded, they align with a significant portion of the U.S. economics community, though nuances exist. Here’s an assessment of the consensus:
  1. Broad Agreement on Economic Harm:
    • Many prominent economists share Krugman’s concerns about the economic fallout of Trump’s tariffs. For example:
      • Larry Summers, former Treasury Secretary, called the tariffs “inexplicable and dangerous,” warning of inflation and job losses.
      • Mark Zandi (Moody’s Analytics) predicted a potential recession with GDP falling 2% and unemployment rising to 7.5% if tariffs persist and provoke retaliation.
      • Greg Daco (Ernst & Young) estimated a 1-1.5% drag on U.S. economic growth and a similar increase in inflation, risking stagflation.
      • Douglas Irwin, a trade historian, noted that Trump’s tariffs “blow an enormous hole” in post-World War II U.S. trade policy, undermining global trade norms.
    • A Wall Street Journal survey of 44 economists in October 2024 found that most believed Trump’s tariffs would not boost domestic manufacturing employment, reflecting skepticism about their effectiveness.
    • A Financial Times and University of Chicago survey showed 70% of economists believed Trump’s economic plan, including tariffs, would be more inflationary than alternatives, indicating a broad concern about price increases.
  2. Skepticism About Fentanyl Rationale:
    • Economists generally agree that tariffs are an ineffective tool for addressing the fentanyl crisis. Joseph Politano, cited by Krugman, notes that fentanyl smuggling occurs through individual crossings, not trade shipments, rendering tariffs irrelevant to the issue.
    • Joseph Stiglitz, another Nobel laureate, emphasized that tariffs provoke retaliation, which could complicate international cooperation on issues like drug trafficking, further undermining the fentanyl rationale.
  3. Dissenting Views and Nuances:
    • While the majority of economists criticize Trump’s tariffs, some acknowledge that targeted tariffs or industrial policies could have strategic value in specific contexts (e.g., protecting nascent industries or countering unfair trade practices). For instance, Krugman himself has supported limited deviations from free trade, such as Biden’s manufacturing subsidies, but he views Trump’s approach as indiscriminate and poorly designed.
    • Economists like David Autor have noted that earlier globalization policies, which Krugman once supported, underestimated the harm to U.S. workers, suggesting that some protectionist measures might resonate with those affected by trade shocks. However, Autor still views Trump’s tariffs as overly blunt and damaging.
    • A minority of economists, particularly those aligned with populist or nationalist views, might support tariffs to promote domestic industries, but this is not the mainstream academic consensus.
  4. Consensus on Trade Deficit Misconceptions:
    • Most economists agree with Krugman that trade deficits are not inherently bad and that tariffs are unlikely to reduce them significantly. The U.S. trade deficit is driven by macroeconomic factors like high domestic consumption and capital inflows, not bilateral trade imbalances. Tariffs may even strengthen the dollar, offsetting any reduction in imports by making U.S. exports more expensive.
Why Economists Share These Concerns
  1. Economic Theory and Evidence:
    • Standard economic theory, supported by historical data, shows that tariffs increase consumer prices and disrupt supply chains. The elasticity of demand for imports (estimated around 4 by Krugman) suggests significant trade reductions, which hurt both importers and exporters.
    • The Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 is a historical cautionary tale, often cited by economists like Thomas Sowell, who warned that Trump’s tariffs could trigger a global trade war with devastating effects, as seen in the Great Depression.
  2. Global Supply Chain Integration:
    • Modern economies are deeply integrated, especially in North America under the USMCA. Tariffs on Canada and Mexico disrupt industries like automotive manufacturing, where parts cross borders multiple times, raising costs and reducing competitiveness.
  3. Retaliation Risks:
    • Economists like Joseph Stiglitz and Marcus Noland (Peterson Institute) emphasize that tariffs provoke retaliation, harming U.S. exports and straining diplomatic relations. This risks a spiral of escalating trade barriers, as seen in Trump’s first term but potentially worse given the scale of current proposals.
  4. Inflation and Recession Risks:
    • With the U.S. near full employment, tariffs could overheat the economy by raising costs without increasing output, leading to stagflation. Deportation policies, if implemented, would exacerbate labor shortages, further limiting manufacturing growth.
  5. Undermining U.S. Credibility:
    • Economists like Krugman and Jeffrey Sachs argue that Trump’s disregard for trade agreements erodes trust in the U.S. as a reliable partner, potentially reducing foreign investment and cooperation on global issues.
Critical Perspective
While Krugman’s critique is grounded in mainstream economics, it’s worth noting potential biases. Krugman has historically leaned toward free trade, though he’s acknowledged past errors in underestimating globalization’s downsides for U.S. workers. His strong language (“malignant stupidity”) reflects both his economic analysis and a critical stance toward Trump’s broader policy approach, which may amplify his rhetoric. Some economists, like Dani Rodrik, have long advocated for more strategic trade policies, suggesting that targeted protectionism could address specific market failures, but even they view Trump’s approach as overly aggressive and poorly executed.
Conclusion
Paul Krugman views Trump’s trade war as “stupid and self-destructive” because it relies on flawed economic assumptions (e.g., trade deficits as inherently bad), lacks strategic coherence, invites retaliation, and risks inflation, recession, and damaged U.S. credibility. He dismisses the fentanyl rationale as a pretext, given the mismatch between tariffs and smuggling patterns. This perspective is broadly shared among U.S. economists, with figures like Summers, Zandi, and Stiglitz echoing concerns about economic disruption and global trade risks. While some economists see value in limited protectionism, the consensus is that Trump’s tariffs are excessively broad, poorly planned, and likely to harm the U.S. economy more than help it.
For further details on Krugman’s views, you can read his Substack at paulkrugman.substack.com or his New York Times columns.

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